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Abstract
Oblivious transfer is a fundamental primitive in cryptography. While perfect in-
formation theoretic security is impossible, quantum oblivious transfer protocols can
limit the dishonest player’s cheating. Finding the optimal security parameters in such
protocols is an important open question. In this paper we show that every 1-out-of-2
oblivious transfer protocol allows a dishonest party to cheat with probability bounded
below by a constant strictly larger than 1/2. Alice’s cheating is defined as her prob-
ability of guessing Bob’s index, and Bob’s cheating is defined as his probability of
guessing both input bits of Alice. In our proof, we relate these cheating probabilities to
the cheating probabilities of a bit commitment protocol and conclude by using lower
bounds on quantum bit commitment. Then, we present an oblivious transfer protocol
with two messages and cheating probabilities at most 3/4. Last, we extend Kitaev’s
semidefinite programming formulation to more general primitives, where the secu-
rity is against a dishonest player trying to force the outcome of the other player, and
prove optimal lower and upper bounds for them.
1 Introduction
Quantum information enables us to do cryptography with information theoretic security.
The first breakthrough result in quantum cryptography is the unconditionally secure key
distribution protocol of Bennett and Brassard [BB84]. Since then, a long series of work has
studied which other cryptographic primitives are possible in the quantum world. How-
ever, the subsequent results were negative. Mayers and Lo, Chau proved the impossibility
of secure ideal quantum bit commitment and oblivious transfer and consequently of any
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type of two-party secure computation [May97, LC97, Lo97, DKSW07]. On the other hand,
several imperfect variants of these primitives have been shown to be possible. Finding the
optimal parameters for such fundamental primitives has been since an important open
question. The reason for looking at these abstract primitives is that they are the basis for
all cryptographic protocols one may wish to construct, including identification schemes,
digital signatures, electronic voting, etc. Let us emphasize that in this paper we only look
at information theoretic security and we do not discuss computational security or security
in restricted models like the bounded-storage [DFSS08] or noisy-storage model [Sch10].
Since the only assumptions used in this paper are those imposed by the laws of quan-
tum mechanics, finding the attainable levels of security is important to understand the
physical limits of these primitives and of quantum protocols in general. These limits also
provide a new way of looking at quantum mechanics from the point of view of informa-
tion or as a theory that arises from the (im)possibility of certain cryptographic primitives.
Needless to say, since we restrict to the study of protocols that are stand-alone and with
imperfect security, they may not be well-suited for practical cryptography.
We start with coin flipping, which was first proposed by Blum [Blu81] and has since
found numerous applications in two-party secure computation. Even though the results
of Mayers and of Lo and Chau exclude the possibility of perfect quantum coin flipping,
i.e., where the resulting coin is perfectly unbiased, it still remained open whether one
can construct a quantum protocol where no player could bias the coin with probability 1.
Aharonov et al. [ATVY00] provided such a protocol where no dishonest player could bias
the coin with probability higher than 0.9143. Then, Ambainis [Amb01] described an im-
proved protocol whose cheating probability was at most 3/4. Subsequently, a number of
different protocols had been proposed [SR01, NS03, KN04] that achieved the same bound
of 3/4.
On the other hand, Kitaev [Kit03], using a formulation of quantum coin flipping as
semidefinite programs proved a lower bound of 1/2 on the product of the cheating prob-
abilities for Alice and Bob (see [ABDR04]). In other words, no quantum coin flipping
protocol can achieve a cheating probability less than 1/
√
2 for both Alice and Bob.
The question of whether 3/4 or 1/
√
2 was the right answer has recently been resolved
by Chailloux and Kerenidis [CK09] who described a protocol with cheating probability
arbitrarily close to 1/
√
2. In their protocol they use as a subroutine a weaker variant of
coin flipping which is referred to as weak coin flipping.
Weak coin flipping protocols with cheating probabilities less than 3/4 were first con-
structed in [SR02, Amb02, KN04]. The best boundwas in fact 1/
√
2 until the breakthrough
result by Mochon who described a protocol with cheating probability 2/3 [Moc05] and
then a protocol that achieves a cheating probability of 1/2 + ε for any ε > 0 [Moc07].
Hence the optimal biases for weak and strong coin flipping are now known.
The question has also been solved for quantum bit commitment where it was shown
that there exist quantum bit commitment protocols with cheating probabilities arbitrarily
close to 0.739 and, moreover, that such protocols are optimal [CK11].
In this paper, we focus on oblivious transfer [Rab81, EGL82, Cre´87], which is a univer-
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sal primitive for any two-party secure computation [Kil88]. We define a 1-out-of-2 ran-
dom oblivious transfer protocol with bias ε, denoted here as random-OT , to be a protocol
where:
• Alice outputs two uniformly random bits (x0, x1)
• Bob outputs xb and b for a uniformly random bit b
• AOT := sup{Pr[Alice guesses b and Bob does not abort ]} = 12 + εA
• BOT := sup{Pr[Bob guesses (x0, x1) and Alice does not abort ]} = 12 + εB
• The bias of the protocol is defined as ε := max{εA, εB}
where the suprema are taken over all strategies for Alice and Bob respectively. Note that in
our definition, the bias is not defined just as an upper bound on the cheating probabilities
but corresponds to the optimal cheating probability.
We note here that an honest Bob can learn both bits with probability 1/2, since he can
learn one bit perfectly and can make a random guess for the other bit.
There is also another variant, denoted asOT , where Alice and Bob have specific values
of (x0, x1) and b as inputs. We show that the two notions are equivalent with respect to ε.
The first impossibility result for quantum OT with information theoretic security was
shown by Lo [Lo97]. The main idea is that if Alice has no information about Bob’s index
b then Bob can learn both bits in the following way: first, Bob honestly runs the protocol
with b = 0 to learn x0 with probability 1; then he locally applies a unitary to his part of the
joint final state in order to transform the joint state to the joint final state in the case of b = 1
and hence learn x1. Since, Bob can learn each bit with probability 1, his measurement does
not change the state and hence he can perform both of them sequentially.
However, notmuch was known about the best possible bias that one can get forOT . In
high level, OT is the “strongest” primitive, since it implies bit commitment, coin flipping,
and in fact any two-party functionality. However, when one looks at the optimal constant
values for the bias, then one needs to be more careful. For example, the standard way of
constructing a bit commitment protocol from OT is the following: Alice and Bob perform
OT with inputs x0, x1, where x0 ⊕ x1 is the committed bit. Since Bob can learn only one
of the two inputs, he has no information about the committed bit. On the other hand, in
the reveal phase, Alice reveals both bits, and since she has no information about which
one Bob has learnt, if she wants to change her mind without getting caught, she can only
do it with probability 1/2 (hence her cheating probability is 3/4). Classically, one can then
repeat this protocol many times in order to take this probability close to 1/2. As we can
see, a perfect OT protocol does not automatically give a perfect bit commitment protocol,
as there is a loss in the parameters. Hence, Kitaev’s lower bound does not a priori hold
for OT , since we do not know how to easily convert an OT protocol to a coin flipping
protocol or bit commitment protocol without any loss.
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Let us also note that in the quantum setting, one can use a large number of bit com-
mitment protocols in order to construct an OT protocol, something which is not known
to be possible classically ([Yao95],[BF10]).
In related work, Salvail, Schaffner and Sotakova [SSS09] have quantitatively studied a
different notion of security for OT protocols (and generally any two-party protocols) that
they call information leakage. Information leakage is defined as the maximum amount
of extra information about the other party’s output given the quantum state held by one
party. They prove, among other results, that any 1-out-of-2 OT protocol has a constant
leakage. Their model is somewhat different, for example they do not allow the players
to abort during the protocol, and their security notion is described in terms of mutual
information and entropy and does not immediately translate to our security notion of
guessing probabilities. However, their results provide more evidence that almost-perfect
OT protocols are impossible for different variants of security.
In another work, Jain, Radhakrishnan and Sen [JRS02] showed that in a 1-out-of-n
OT protocol, if Alice gets t bits of information about Bob’s index b, then Bob gets at least
Ω(n/2O(t)) bits of information about Alice’s string x.
In this paper, we quantitatively study the bias of quantum oblivious transfer protocols.
More precisely, we construct a bit commitment protocol that usesOT as a subroutine and
show a relation between the cheating probabilities of the OT protocol and the ones of
the bit commitment protocol. Then, using a lower bound for quantum bit commitment,
we derive a non-trivial lower bound (albeit weaker) on the cheating probabilities for OT .
More precisely we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1: In any quantum oblivious transfer protocol, we have
max {AOT , BOT } ≥ 0.5852.
This result shows that there is a constant lower bound on the bias of every OT pro-
tocol. In other words, the bias cannot be “amplified” to the level used in completeness
assumptions. Thus, further restrictions (beyond those enforced by the laws of quantum
mechanics) are needed to use quantum OT protocols as a “building block” for more elab-
orate protocols.
In Section 4, we describe a simple 1-out-of-2 random-OT protocol and analyze the
cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob.
Theorem 2: There exists a quantum oblivious transfer protocol such thatAOT = BOT =
3
4 .
One may wonder if it would be possible to extend Kitaev’s semidefinite programming
formulation to include the OT primitive and get a stronger lower bound this way. In fact,
in Section 5 we describe a generalisation of Kitaev’s semidefinite program that captures a
variant of the general k-out-of-n OT primitive. Coin flipping, is then the special case of
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1-out-of-1 OT . However, there is a big difference. What the semidefinite programming
formulation captures is the probability that one party can force the outcome of the other
party.
More precisely, we define a k-out-of-n forcing oblivious transfer protocol, denoted
here as
(
n
k
)
-fOT, with forcing bias ε as a protocol satisfying:
• Alice outputs n random bits x := (x1, . . . , xn)
• Bob outputs a random index set b of k indices and bit string xb consisting of xi for
i ∈ b
• Ab,xb := sup{Pr[Alice can force Bob to output (b, xb)]} =
εA(
n
k
) · 2k
• Bx := sup{Pr[Bob can force Alice to output x]} = εB
2n
• The forcing bias of the protocol is defined as ε := max{εA, εB}
where, again, the suprema are over all strategies of Alice and Bob respectively. First,
notice our definition of the bias ε as a multiplicative factor instead of additive. We choose
this since the honest probabilities of the two players can be very different and in this case
our definition makes more sense.
More importantly, this “forcing” security definition is exactly what is needed in coin
flipping since, there, Alice and Bob know each others outputs and the only cheating is
forcing the other player’s output in order to get a specific value for the coin. However, this
is very different than the probability that one player can guess the outcome of the other
player, which is the security guarantee we wish for in an OT protocol. Due to this subtle
difference in the security definition, there are few connections between the bias of an OT
protocol and to that of its forcing variant. For example, a strategy for Bob which allows
him to forceAlice to output (x0, x1) = (0, 0)with probability 1/2 is nontrivial in the forcing
setting. However, the same strategy may only let Bob learn (x0, x1) with probability 1/2,
which is the same probability had he been honest and learned x0 or x1 perfectly.
Nevertheless, it is still interesting to know how one can extend Kitaev’s semidefinite
programming formulation, what are the most general primitives that can be described in
this framework, and what are their applications. For these k-out-of-n “forcing” primitives
we provide optimal upper and lower bounds.
Theorem 3: In any
(
n
k
)
-fOT protocol and consistent b, x, xb (that is, when xb is the b entries
of x) we have
Bx ·Ab,xb ≥ Pr[Alice honestly outputs x and Bob honestly outputs (b, xb)] =
1(
n
k
)
2n
.
In particular, the forcing bias satisfies ε ≥ √2k.
Note that for the special case of coin flipping, which is
(
1
1
)
-fOT, our bounds are tight
(a multiplicative bias of
√
2 is equivalent to a cheating probability of 1√
2
).
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Similar to coin flipping, one can get optimal protocols as well for
(
n
k
)
-fOT.
Theorem 4: Let γ > 0. There exists a protocol for
(
n
k
)
-fOTwith cheating probabilities:
Ab,xb ≤
√
2
k
(1 + γ)(
n
k
) · 2k and Bx ≤
√
2
k
(1 + γ)
2n
.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions of Primitives
In the literature, many different variants of oblivious transfer have been considered. In
this paper, we consider two variants of quantum oblivious transfer and for completeness
we show that they are equivalent with respect to the bias ε.
Definition 5: [RandomOblivious Transfer] A 1-out-of-2 quantum randomoblivious trans-
fer protocol with bias ε, denoted here as random-OT , is a protocol between Alice and Bob
such that:
• Alice outputs two bits (x0, x1) or Abort and Bob outputs two bits (b, y) or Abort
• If Alice and Bob are honest, they never Abort, y = xb, Alice has no information
about b and Bob has no information about xb. Also, x0, x1, b are uniformly random
bits.
• AOT := sup{Pr[Alice guesses b and Bob does not Abort]} = 12 + εA
• BOT := sup{Pr[Bob guesses (x0, x1) and Alice does not Abort]} = 12 + εB
• The bias of the protocol is defined as ε := max{εA, εB}
where the suprema are taken over all cheating strategies for Alice and Bob.
Note that this definition is slightly different from usual definitions because we want
the exact value of the cheating probabilities and not only an upper bound. This is because
we consider both lower bounds and upper bounds for OT protocols but we could have
equivalent results using the standard definitions.
An important issue is that we quantify the security against a cheating Bob as the prob-
ability that he can guess (x0, x1). One can imagine a security definition where Bob’s
guessing probability is not for (x0, x1), but for example for x0 ⊕ x1 or any other func-
tion f(x0, x1). Since we are mostly interested in lower bounds, we believe our definition
is the most appropriate one, since a lower bound on the probability of guessing (x0, x1)
automatically yields a lower bound on the probability of guessing any f(x0, x1). Note
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that in classical cryptography, if Bob does not know x0 ⊕ x1, then this implies he does not
know one of the two bits [DFSS06].
We now define a second notion of OT where the values (x0, x1) and b are Alice’s and
Bob’s inputs respectively and show the equivalence between the two notions.
Definition 6: [Oblivious Transfer] A 1-out-of-2 quantum oblivious transfer protocol with
bias ε, denoted here as OT , is a protocol between Alice and Bob such that:
• Alice has input x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} and Bob has input b ∈ {0, 1}. At the beginning of
the protocol, Alice has no information about b and Bob has no information about
(x0, x1)
• At the end of the protocol, Bob outputs y or Abort and Alice can either Abort or not
• If Alice and Bob are honest, they never Abort, y = xb, Alice has no information
about b and Bob has no information about xb
• AOT := sup{Pr[Alice guesses b and Bob does not Abort]} = 12 + εA
• BOT := sup{Pr[Bob guesses (x0, x1) and Alice does not Abort]} = 12 + εB
• The bias of the protocol is defined as ε := max{εA, εB}
where the suprema are taken over all cheating strategies for Alice and Bob.
We also define quantum bit commitment.
Definition 7: [Bit Commitment] A quantum commitment scheme is an interactive proto-
col between Alice and Bob with two phases, a Commit phase and a Reveal phase.
• In the Commit phase, Alice interacts with Bob in order to commit to b
• In the Reveal phase, Alice interacts with Bob in order to reveal b. Bob decides to
accept or reject depending on the revealed value of b and his final state. We say that
Alice successfully reveals b if Bob accepts the revealed value.
We define the following security requirements for the commitment scheme.
• Completeness: If Alice and Bob are both honest then Alice always successfully reveals
the bit b which she has committed
• Binding property: For any cheating Alice and for honest Bob, we define Alice’s cheat-
ing probability as
ABC =
1
2
(Pr[Alice successfully reveals b = 0] + Pr[Alice successfully reveals b = 1])
• Hiding property: For any cheating Bob and for honest Alice, we define Bob’s cheating
probability as
BBC = Pr[Bob guesses b after the Commit phase].
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Remark: The definition of quantum bit commitment we use is the standard one when
one studies stand-alone cryptographic primitives. In this setting, quantum bit commit-
ment has a clear relation to other fundamental primitives such as coin flipping and obliv-
ious transfer [ATVY00, Amb01, Kit03, Moc07]. Moreover, the study of such primitives
sheds light on the physical limits of quantum mechanics and the power of entanglement.
Recently there have been some stronger definitions of quantum bit commitment protocols
that suit better practical uses (see for example [DFR+07]).
We have the following lower bound for quantum bit commitment [CK11].
Proposition 8: [[CK11]] For any quantum bit commitment scheme with cheating proba-
bilities ABC and BBC , there is a parameter t ∈ [0, 1] such that
ABC ≥
(
1−
(
1− 1√
2
)
t
)2
and BBC ≥ 1
2
+
t
2
.
2.2 Equivalence Between the Different Notions of Oblivious Transfer
We show the equivalence between OT and random-OT with respect to the bias ε.
Proposition 9: Let P be an OT protocol with bias ε. We can construct a random-OT
protocol Q with bias ε using P .
Proof: The construction of the OT protocol Q is pretty straightforward:
1. Alice picks x0, x1 ∈R {0, 1} uniformly at random and Bob picks b ∈R {0, 1} uni-
formly at random.
2. Alice and Bob perform the OT protocol P where Alice inputs x0, x1 and Bob inputs
b. Let y be Bob’s output. Note that at this point, Alice has no information about b
and Bob has no information about (x0, x1).
3. Alice and Bob abort in Q if and only if they abort in P . Otherwise, the outputs of
protocol Q are (x0, x1) for Alice and (b, y) for Bob.
The outcomes of Q are uniformly random bits since Alice and Bob choose their inputs
uniformly at random. All the other requirements that make Q an OT protocol with bias ε
are satisfied because P is an OT protocol with bias ε. 
We now prove how to go from a random-OT to an OT protocol.
Proposition 10: Let P be a random-OT protocol with bias εP . We can construct an OT
protocol Q with bias εQ = εP using P .
Proof: Let P be a random-OT protocol with bias εP . Consider the following protocolQ:
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1. Alice has inputsX0,X1 and Bob has an input B.
2. Alice and Bob run protocol P and output (x0, x1) for Alice and (b, y) for Bob.
3. Bob sends r = b⊕B to Alice. Let x′c = xc⊕r, for c ∈ {0, 1}.
4. Alice sends to Bob (s0, s1)where sc = x
′
c ⊕Xc for c ∈ {0, 1}. Let y′ = y ⊕ sB .
5. Alice and Bob abort in Q if and only if they abort in P . Otherwise, the output of the
protocol is y′ for Bob.
We now show that our protocol is an OT protocol with bias εP . First, note that the values
x′c are known by Alice and the value y′ is known by Bob. Also, notice that x′B = xB⊕r = xb.
• Alice and Bob are honest: By definition we have y = xb. Then, we have
y′ = y ⊕ sB = xb ⊕ sB = x′B ⊕ sB = XB .
Moreover, Alice knows r but has no information about b and hence she has no in-
formation about B = b ⊕ r. Bob knows (s0, s1) and r but has no information about
xb¯, hence he has no information about XB¯ = x
′
B¯
⊕ sB¯ = x′¯b⊕r ⊕ sb¯⊕r = xb¯ ⊕ sb¯⊕r.
• Cheating Alice: Alice knows r and B = b⊕ r. Hence
AOT (Q) = sup{Pr[Alice guessesB and Bob does not Abort]}
= sup{Pr[Alice guesses b and Bob does not Abort]} = AOT (P ).
• Cheating Bob: Bob knows r and (s0, s1). We have Xc = x′c ⊕ sc = xc⊕r ⊕ sc so it is
equivalent for Bob to guess (X0,X1) and (x0, x1). Hence
BOT (Q) = sup{Pr[Bob guesses (X0,X1) and Alice does not Abort]}
= sup{Pr[Bob guesses (x0, x1) and Alice does not Abort]} = BOT (P ).
We can now conclude for the biases
εQ = max{AOT (Q), BOT (Q)} − 1
2
= max{AOT (P ), BOT (P )} − 1
2
= εP . 
3 A Lower Bound on Any Oblivious Transfer Protocol
In this section we prove that the bias of any random-OT protocol, and hence any OT
protocol, is bounded below by a constant. We start from a random-OT protocol and first
show how to construct a bit commitment protocol. Then, we prove a relation between
the cheating probabilities of the bit commitment protocol and those in the random-OT
protocol. Last, we use the lower bound for quantum bit commitment (Proposition 8) to
derive a lower bound on any OT protocol.
We create a bit commitment protocol from a random-OT protocol as follows.
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Bit Commitment Protocol via random-OT
1. Commit phase: We invert the roles of Alice and Bob. Bob is the one who commits.
He wants to commit to a bit a. Alice and Bob perform the OT protocol such that
Alice has (x0, x1) and Bob has (b, xb). Bob sends c := a⊕ b to Alice.
2. Reveal phase: Bob reveals b and y = xb to Alice. If xb from Bob is consistent with
Alice’s bits then Alice accepts c⊕ b = a. Otherwise Alice aborts.
We now analyze how much Alice and Bob can cheat in the bit commitment protocol
and compare these quantities to the bias of the random-OT protocol. LetAOT , BOT be the
cheating probabilities for the quantum oblivious transfer protocol and ABC , BBC be the
cheating probabilities for the resulting quantum bit commitment protocol. Our goal is to
show the following:
Proposition 11: For the protocol above, we have
AOT = ABC and BOT ≥ f(BBC) where f(x) = x(2x− 1)2.
Proof: Let ¬⊥BCA (resp. ¬⊥BCB ) denote the event “Alice (resp. Bob) does not abort during
the entire bit commitment protocol”. Let ¬⊥OTA (resp. ¬⊥OTB ) denote the event “Alice
(resp. Bob) does not abort during the random-OT subroutine”.
Cheating Alice
By definition, AOT is the optimal probability of Alice guessing b in the random-OT
protocol without Bob aborting and ABC is the optimal probability of Alice guessing a
in the bit commitment protocol without Bob aborting. Since Alice knows c := a ⊕ b,
the probability of Alice guessing a in the bit commitment protocol is the same as the
probability of her guessing b in the random-OT protocol. Thus AOT = ABC .
Cheating Bob
By definition, BOT is the optimal probability of Bob learning both bits in the random-
OT protocol without Alice aborting. Thus,
BOT = sup{Pr[ (Bob guesses (x0, x1)) ∧ ¬⊥OTA ]}
= sup{Pr[¬⊥OTA ] · Pr[ (Bob guesses (x0, x1))|¬⊥OTA ]}.
where the suprema are taken over all strategies for Bob.
If Bob wants to reveal 0 in the bit commitment protocol (a similar argument works
if he wants to reveal 1), then first, Alice must not abort in the random-OT protocol and
second, Bob must send b = c as well as the correct xc such that Alice does not abort in the
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last round of the bit commitment protocol. This is equivalent to saying that Bob succeeds
if he guesses xc and Alice does not abort in the random-OT protocol. Since Bob randomly
chooses which bit he wants to reveal, we can write the probability of Bob cheating as
BBC = max
{
1
2
Pr[(Bob guesses x0) ∧ ¬⊥OTA ] +
1
2
Pr[(Bob guesses x1) ∧ ¬⊥OTA ]
}
= max
{
Pr[¬⊥OTA ]
2
(
Pr[(Bob guesses x0)|¬⊥OTA ] + Pr[(Bob guesses x1)|¬⊥OTA ]
)}
.
Notice that we use “max” instead of “sup” above. This is because an optimal strategy
exists for every bit commitment protocol. To see this, we can construct a coin flipping
protocol from any bit commitment protocol and an optimal strategy always exists for
any coin flipping protocol. This is a consequence of strong duality in the semidefinite
programming formalism of coin flipping protocols [Kit03], see [ABDR04] for details.
Let us now fix Bob’s optimal cheating strategy in the bit commitment protocol. For
this strategy, let p = Pr[(Bob guesses x0)|¬⊥OTA ], q = Pr[(Bob guesses x1)|¬⊥OTA ] and let
a = p+q2 . Note that, without loss of generality, we can assume that Bob’smeasurements are
projective measurements. This can be done by increasing the dimension of Bob’s space.
Also, Alice has a projective measurement on her space to determine the bits (x0, x1).
We use the following lemma to relate BBC and BOT .
Lemma 12: [Learning-In-Sequence Lemma] Let p, q ∈ [1/2, 1]. Let Alice and Bob share a
joint pure state. SupposeAlice performs a projectivemeasurementM = {Mx0,x1}x0,x1∈{0,1}
on her space to determine the values of (x0, x1). Suppose there is a projective measure-
ment P = {P0, P1} on Bob’s space that allows him to guess bit x0 with probability p and
a projective measurement Q = {Q0, Q1} on his space that allows him to guess bit x1 with
probability q. Then, there exists a measurement on Bob’s space that allows him to guess
(x0, x1)with probability at least a(2a− 1)2 where a = p+q2 .
We postpone the proof of this lemma to Subsection 3.1.
We now construct a cheating strategy for Bob for the OT protocol: Run the optimal
bit commitment strategy and look at Bob’s state after Step 1 conditioned on ¬⊥OTA . Note
that this event happens with nonzero probability in the optimal bit commitment strategy
since otherwise the success probability is 0. The optimal bit commitment strategy gives
measurements that allow Bob to guess x0 with probability p and x1 with probability q.
Bob uses these measurements and the procedure of Lemma 12 to guess (x0, x1). Letm be
the probability he guesses (x0, x1). From Lemma 12, we have that m ≥ a(2a − 1)2. By
definition of BOT and BBC , we have:
m = Pr[ (Bob guesses (x0, x1))|¬⊥OTA ] ≤
BOT
Pr[¬⊥OTA ]
and a =
BBC
Pr[¬⊥OTA ]
.
This gives us
BOT
Pr[¬⊥OTA ]
≥ BBC
Pr[¬⊥OTA ]
(
2
BBC
Pr[¬⊥OTA ]
− 1
)2
=⇒ BOT ≥ BBC (2BBC − 1)2 ,
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where the implication holds since BBC ≥ 1/2. 
Using this proposition and the lower bound for quantum bit commitment, we can
show a lower bound.
Theorem 1: In any quantum oblivious transfer protocol, at least one of the players can
cheat with probability 0.5852.
Proof: We use ABC = AOT and BOT ≥ f(BBC) (where f(x) = x(2x − 1)2) from Proposi-
tion 11. From Proposition 8, we have that for any quantum bit commitment scheme, there
exists a parameter t ∈ [0, 1] such that
BBC ≥
(
1−
(
1− 1√
2
)
t
)2
≥ 1
2
and ABC ≥ 1
2
+
t
2
≥ 1
2
,
noting that we have reversed the roles of Alice and Bob in the bit commitment protocol.
We immediately have that there exists a parameter t ∈ [0, 1] such that
BOT ≥ f
(
1−
(
1− 1√
2
)
t
)2
and AOT ≥ 1
2
+
t
2
,
since f is nondecreasing on the interval [1/2, 1]. We get a lower bound onmax {AOT , BOT }
by equating the lower bounds above and solving for t ≈ 0.1705 (t is the solution of a
degree 6 polynomial, thus we do not know any closed form for t). At this value of t, we
have AOT , BOT ≈ 0.5852, yielding the desired bound. 
3.1 Proof of the Learning-In-Sequence Lemma
Wefirst provide three claims that enable us to prove a geometric statement about perform-
ing two projective measurements in sequence on the same quantum state (Lemma 16) and
then, we use this geometric lemma to prove the Learning-in-Sequence Lemma.
Claim 13: Let |X〉 and |Y 〉 be pure states and Q a projection such that Q|Y 〉 = |Y 〉. Then
we have
‖Q|X〉‖22 ≥ |〈X|Y 〉|2.
Proof: Using Cauchy-Schwarz we have
|〈X|Y 〉|2 = |〈X|Q|Y 〉|2 ≤ ‖Q|X〉‖22 ‖|Y 〉‖22 = ‖Q|X〉‖22 . 
Claim 14: Suppose θ, θ′ ∈ [0, pi/4]. If |〈ψ|φ〉| ≥ cos(θ) and |〈φ|ξ〉| ≥ cos(θ′) then
|〈ψ|ξ〉| ≥ cos(θ + θ′).
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Proof: Define the angle between two pure states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 as A(ψ, φ) := arccos |〈ψ|φ〉|.
This is a metric (see [NC00] page 413). Thus we have
arccos |〈ψ|ξ〉| = A(ψ, ξ) ≤ A(ψ, φ) +A(φ, ξ) = arccos |〈ψ|φ〉| + arccos |〈φ|ξ〉| ≤ θ + θ′.
Taking the cosine of both sides yields the result. 
Claim 15: Let θ, θ′ ∈ [0, pi/4]. Then
cos(θ + θ′) ≥ cos2(θ) + cos2(θ′)− 1.
Proof: Without loss of generality suppose that θ ≥ θ′. Consider the function
f(θ) = cos(θ + θ′)− cos2(θ) + sin2(θ′)
for fixed θ′. Taking its derivative we get
f ′(θ) = − sin(θ + θ′) + sin(2θ)
which is nonnegative for θ ∈ [θ′, pi/4]. Since f(θ′) = 0, we conclude that f(θ) ≥ 0 for
θ ∈ [θ′, pi/4] which gives the desired result. 
Lemma 16: Let |ψ〉 be a pure state and let {C, I − C} and {D, I − D} be two projective
measurements such that
cos2(θ) := ‖C|ψ〉‖22 ≥
1
2
and cos2(θ′) := ‖D|ψ〉‖22 ≥
1
2
.
Then we have
‖DC|ψ〉‖22 ≥ cos2(θ) cos2(θ + θ′).
Proof: Define the following states
|X〉 := C|ψ〉‖C|ψ〉‖2
, |X ′〉 := (I − C)|ψ〉‖(I − C)|ψ〉‖2
, |Y 〉 := D|ψ〉‖D|ψ〉‖2
, |Y ′〉 := (I −D)|ψ〉‖(I −D)|ψ〉‖2
.
Then we can write |ψ〉 = cos(θ)|X〉+ eiα sin(θ)|X ′〉 and |ψ〉 = cos(θ′)|Y 〉+ eiβ sin(θ′)|Y ′〉
with α, β ∈ R. Then we have
‖DC|ψ〉‖22 = cos2(θ) ‖D|X〉‖22
≥ cos2(θ)|〈Y |X〉|2 (Claim 13)
≥ cos2(θ) cos2(θ + θ′) (Claim 14). 
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We now prove Lemma 12.
Proof: Let |Ω〉AB be the joint pure state shared by Alice and Bob, where A is the space
controlled by Alice and B the space controlled by Bob.
LetM = {Mx0,x1}x0,x1∈{0,1} be Alice’s projective measurement on A to determine her
outputs x0, x1. Let P = {P0, P1} be Bob’s projective measurement that allows him to
guess x0 with probability p = cos
2(θ) and Q = {Q0, Q1} be Bob’s projective measurement
that allows him to guess x1 with probability q = cos
2(θ′). These measurements are on B
only. Now we can write a = p+q2 =
cos2(θ)+cos2(θ′)
2 . We consider the following projections
on AB:
C =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗ Px0 and D =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗Qx1 .
C (resp. D) is the projection on the subspace where Bob guesses correctly the first bit
(resp. the second bit) after applying P (resp. Q).
A strategy for Bob to learn both bits is simple: apply the two measurements P and Q
one after the other, where the first one is chosen uniformly at random.
The projection on the subspace where Bob guesses (x0, x1)when applying P thenQ is
E =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗Qx1Px0 = DC.
Similarly, the projection on the subspace where Bob guesses (x0, x1) when applying Q
then P is
F =
∑
x0,x1
Mx0,x1 ⊗ Px0Qx1 = CD.
With this strategy Bob can guess both bits with probability
1
2
(||E|Ω〉||22 + ||F |Ω〉||22) = 12 (||DC|Ω〉||22 + ||CD|Ω〉||22)
≥ 1
2
(
cos2(θ) + cos2(θ′)
)
cos2(θ + θ′) (Lemma 16)
≥ 1
2
(
cos2(θ) + cos2(θ′)
) (
cos2(θ) + cos2(θ′)− 1)2 (Claim 15)
= a(2a− 1)2.
Note that we can use Lemma 16 since Bob’s optimal measurement to guess x0 and x1
succeeds for each bit with probability at least 1/2. 
4 A Two-Message Protocol With Bias 1/4
We present in this section a random-OT protocol with bias 1/4. This also implies, as we
have shown, an OT protocol with inputs with the same bias.
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Random Oblivious Transfer Protocol
1. Bob chooses b ∈R {0, 1} and creates the state |φb〉 := 1√2 |bb〉+
1√
2
|22〉.
Bob sends one of the qutrits to Alice.
2. Alice chooses x0, x1 ∈R {0, 1} and applies the unitary |a〉 → (−1)xa |a〉,
where x2 := 0, on Bob’s qutrit.
3. Alice returns the qutrit to Bob who now has the state |ψb〉 := (−1)
x
b√
2
|bb〉+ 1√
2
|22〉.
4. Bob performs the measurement {Π0 = |φb〉〈φb|, Π1 := |φ′b〉〈φ′b|, I −Π0 −Π1}
on the state |ψb〉, where |φ′b〉 := 1√2 |bb〉 −
1√
2
|22〉.
5. If the outcome is Π0 then xb = 0, if it is Π1 then xb = 1, otherwise he aborts.
It is clear that Bob can learn x0 or x1 perfectly. Moreover, note that if he sends half of
the state 1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|11〉 then he can also learn x0 ⊕ x1 perfectly (although in this case he
does not learn either of x0 or x1). We now show that it is impossible for him to perfectly
learn both x0 and x1 and also that his bit is not completely revealed to a cheating Alice.
Theorem 2: In the protocol described above, we have AOT = BOT =
3
4 .
Proof: We analyze the cheating probabilities of each party.
Cheating Alice
Define Bob’s space as B and let σb := TrB(|φb〉〈φb|) denote the two reduced states
Alice may receive in the first message. Then, the optimal strategy for Alice to learn b is
to perform the optimal measurement to distinguish between σ0 and σ1. In this case, she
succeeds with probability
1
2
+
1
4
‖σ0 − σ1‖tr =
3
4
,
(see for example [KN04]). Alice’s optimal measurement is, in fact, a measurement in the
computational basis. If she gets outcome |0〉 or |1〉 then she knows b with certainty. If she
gets outcome |2〉 then she guesses. Notice also, that even after this measurement she can
return the measured qutrit to Bob and the outcome of Bob’s measurement will always be
either Π0 or Π1. Hence, Bob will never abort.
Cheating Bob
Bob wants to learn both bits (x0, x1). We now describe a general strategy for Bob:
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• Bob creates |ψ〉 = ∑i αi|i〉A|ei〉B and sends the A part to Alice. The |ei〉’s are not
necessarily orthogonal but
∑
i |αi|2 = 1.
• Alice applies Ux0,x1 on her part and sends it back to Bob. We can write Bob’s state
as |ψx0,x1〉 =
∑
i αi(−1)xi |i〉|ei〉 recalling that x2 := 0.
At the end of the protocol, Bob applies a two-outcome measurement on |ψx0,x1〉 to get his
guess for (x0, x1).
From this strategy, we create another strategy with the same cheating probability
where Bob sends a pure state. We define this strategy as follows:
• Bob creates |ψ′〉 =∑i αi|i〉A and sends the whole state to Alice.
• Alice applies Ux0,x1 on her part and sends it back to Bob. We can write Bob’s state
as |ψ′x0,x1〉 =
∑
i αi(−1)xi |i〉 recalling that x2 := 0.
• Bob applies the unitary U : |i〉|0〉 → |i〉|ei〉 to |ψ′x0,x1〉|0〉 and obtains |ψx0,x1〉.
To determine (x0, x1), Bob applies the same measurement as in the original strategy.
Clearly both strategies have the same success probability. When Bob uses the second
strategy, Alice and Bob are unentangled after the first message and Alice sends back a
qutrit to Bob. Using an information bound (reproduced below for completeness), we
have
Pr[Bob correctly guesses (x0, x1)] ≤ 3/4.
Claim 17: [[DdW11] following [Nay99]] Suppose we have a classical random variable
X, uniformly distributed over [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Let x → |φx〉 be some encoding of [n],
where |φx〉 is a pure state in a d-dimensional space. Let P1, . . . , Pn be the measurement
operators applied for decoding; these sum to the d-dimensional identity operator. Then
the probability of correctly decoding in case X = x is
px = ||Px|φx〉||2 ≤ Tr(Px).
The expected success probability is
1
n
n∑
x=1
px ≤ 1
n
n∑
x=1
Tr(Px) =
1
n
Tr
(
n∑
x=1
Px
)
=
1
n
Tr(I) =
d
n
.
Note that there is a strategy for Bob to achieve 3/4. Bob wants to learn both bits
(x0, x1). Suppose he creates the state
|ψ〉 := 1√
3
|0〉+ 1√
3
|1〉 + 1√
3
|2〉
and sends it to Alice. The state he receives is
|ψx0,x1〉 :=
1√
3
(−1)x0 |0〉+ 1√
3
(−1)x1 |1〉+ 1√
3
|2〉.
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Then, Bob performs a projective measurement in the 4-dimensional basis
{|Ψx0,x1〉 : x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}}
where
|Ψx0,x1〉 :=
1
2
(−1)x0 |0〉+ 1
2
(−1)x1 |1〉+ 1
2
|2〉 + 1
2
(−1)x0⊕x1 |3〉.
The probability that Bob guesses the two bits x0, x1 correctly is
∑
x0,x1
1
4
Pr[Bob guesses (x0, x1)] =
∑
x0,x1
1
4
|〈Ψx0,x1 |ψx0,x1〉|2 =
3
4
.
Note that in our protocol Alice never aborts. 
5 Oblivious Transfer as a Forcing Primitive
Here, we discuss a variant of oblivious transfer, as a generalization of coin flipping, that
can be analyzed using an extension of Kitaev’s semidefinite programming formalism.
Definition 18: [Forcing Oblivious Transfer] A k-out-of-n forcing oblivious transfer proto-
col, denoted here as
(
n
k
)
-fOT, with forcing bias ε is a protocol satisfying:
• Alice outputs n random bits x := (x1, . . . , xn)
• Bob outputs a random index set b of k indices and bit string xb consisting of xi for
i ∈ b
• Ab,xb := sup{Pr[Alice can force Bob to output (b, xb)]} =
εA(
n
k
) · 2k
• Bx := sup{Pr[Bob can force Alice to output x]} = εB
2n
• The forcing bias of the protocol is defined as ε = max{εA, εB}
where the suprema are taken over all strategies of Alice and Bob.
The main difference in this new primitive is the definition of security. Here, we de-
sign protocols to protect against a dishonest party being able to force a desired value as
the output of the other player. In the previous section (and in the literature) oblivious
transfer protocols are designed to protect against the dishonest party learning the other
party’s output. Notice, for example, that in coin flipping we can design protocols to pro-
tect against a dishonest party forcing a desired outcome, but both players learn the coin
outcome perfectly.
The primitive we have defined is indeed a generalization of coin flipping since we
can cast the problem of coin flipping as a 1-out-of-1 forcing oblivious transfer protocol.
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Of course, in
(1
1
)
-fOT Alice always knows Bob’s index set so the forcing bias is the only
interesting notion of security in this case.
As we said, we define the bias ε as a multiplicative factor instead of additive, since
the honest probabilities can be much different and in this case our definition makes more
sense. To relate this bias to the one previously studied in coin flipping we have that coin
flipping protocols with bias ε ≤ √2 + δ exist for any δ > 0, see [CK09], and weak coin
flipping protocols with bias ε ≤ 1 + δ exist for any δ > 0, see [Moc07].
5.1 Extending Kitaev’s Lower Bound to Forcing Oblivious Transfer
We now extend Kitaev’s formalism from the setting of coin flipping to the more general
setting of
(
n
k
)
-fOT.
Suppose Alice and Bob have private spaces A and B, respectively, and both have ac-
cess to a message spaceM each initialized in state |0〉. Then, we can define an m-round(
n
k
)
-fOT protocol using the following parameters:
• Alice’s unitary operators UA,1, . . . , UA,m which act on A⊗M
• Bob’s unitary operators UB,1, . . . , UB,m which act onM⊗B
• Alice’s POVM {ΠA,abort} ∪ {ΠA,x : x ∈ Zn2} acting on A, one for each outcome
• Bob’s POVM {ΠB,abort} ∪
{
ΠB,(b,xb) : b a k-element subset of n indices, xb ∈ Zk2
}
act-
ing on B, one for each outcome
We now show the criteria for which the parameters above yield a proper
(
n
k
)
-fOT protocol.
In a proper protocol we require that Alice and Bob’s measurements are consistent and that
the outcomes are uniformly random when the protocol is followed honestly. Define
|ψ〉 := (IA ⊗ UB,m)(UA,m ⊗ IB) · · · (IA ⊗ UB,1)(UA,1 ⊗ IB)|0〉A⊗M⊗B
to be the state at the end of an honest run of the protocol. Then, we require the unitary
and measurement operators to satisfy the following condition:
∥∥(ΠA,x ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,(b,xb))|ψ〉∥∥22 = 1(n
k
)
2n
for (x, b, xb) consistent.
Similar to coin flipping, we can capture cheating strategies as semidefinite programs.
Bob can force Alice to output a specific x ∈ Zn2 with maximum probability equal to the
optimal value of the following semidefinite program
Bx = max 〈ΠA,x ⊗ IM, ρA,N 〉
subject to TrM(ρA,0) = |0〉〈0|A
TrM(ρA,j) = TrM(UA,jρA,j−1U∗A,j), for j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
ρA,0, . . . , ρA,N ∈ Pos(A⊗M), for j ∈ {0, . . . , N} ,
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where Pos(H) is the set of positive semidefinite matrices over the Hilbert space H. The
states ρi represent the part of the state under Alice’s control after Bob sends his i’th mes-
sage. The constraints above are necessary since Bob cannot apply a unitary onA. They are
also sufficient since Bob can maintain a purification during the protocol consistent with
the states above to achieve a cheating probability given by the corresponding objective
value.
To capture Alice’s cheating strategies we can do the same as for cheating Bob and
examine the states under Bob’s control during the course of the protocol. That is, Alice can
force Bob to output a specific k-element subset b and xb ∈ Zk2 with maximum probability
equal to the optimal value of the following semidefinite program
Ab,xb = max 〈IM ⊗ΠB,(b,xb), ρB,N 〉
subject to TrM(ρB,0) = |0〉〈0|B
TrM(ρB,j) = TrM(UB,jρB,j−1U∗B,j), for j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
ρB,0, . . . , ρB,N ∈ Pos(M⊗B), for j ∈ {0, . . . , N} .
The proofs that these capture the optimal cheating probabilities are the same as those
used for coin flipping in [Kit03] and [ABDR04]. Using these semidefinite programs we
can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3: In any
(
n
k
)
-fOT protocol and consistent b, x, xb (that is, when xb is the b entries
of x) we have
Bx ·Ab,xb ≥ Pr[Alice honestly outputs x and Bob honestly outputs (b, xb)] =
1(
n
k
)
2n
.
In particular, the forcing bias satisfies ε ≥ √2k.
Once we extended the semidefinite programming formulation, the proof of the the-
orem follows almost directly from the proof in [Kit03] and [ABDR04] for coin flipping
except that the honest outcome probabilities are different in our case. Namely, for |ψ〉
defined above, we have
∥∥(ΠA,x ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,(b,xb))|ψ〉∥∥22 = 1(n
k
)
2n
when x, b, and xb are consistent and 0 otherwise.
5.2 A Protocol with Optimal Forcing Bias
In this section we prove Theorem 4. First, consider the following protocol which achieves
the bound in Theorem 3 but is asymmetric. Alice sends n random bits to Bob. Bob, then,
outputs b, a random k-index subset of n indices, and xb. In this protocol Bob can force a de-
sired outcome with probability 12n and Alice can force a desired outcome with probability
1
(n
k
)
. Thus the product of the cheating probabilities is optimal, that is it achieves the lower
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bound in Theorem 3. However the protocol is asymmetric. This can be easily remedied
using coin flipping. We present an optimal protocol with this security definition.
An Optimal
(
n
k
)
-fOT Protocol with Forcing Bias
√
2
k
1. Bob outputs a random index set b of k indices and sends the result to Alice.
2. Alice and Bob play a coin flipping game with bias
√
2 + δ
(for a δ > 0 sufficiently small) to determine each bit in xb.
3. Alice randomly chooses her bits not in b.
Theorem 4: For any γ > 0 we can choose a δ > 0 such that the
(
n
k
)
-fOT protocol above
satisfies
Ab,xb ≤
√
2
k
(1 + γ)(
n
k
) · 2k and Bx ≤
√
2
k
(1 + γ)
2n
.
Proof: Fix γ > 0 and a coin flipping parameter δ > 0 such that
(
1√
2
+ δ2
)k
≤
√
2
k
(1+γ)
2k
.
This can be achieved by taking δ = O(γ
k
). This sets an upper bound on the probability
of forcing a k bit-string using k coin flipping protocols each with a maximum cheating
probability of 1√
2
+ δ2 . We now analyze each party cheating. For Alice cheating, she has
no control over the index set but she can try to force a particular bit-string for xb. Her
maximum cheating probability is
1(
n
k
) · ( 1√
2
+
δ
2
)k
≤ 1(n
k
) ·
√
2
k
(1 + γ)
2k
=
√
2
k
(1 + γ)(
n
k
)
2k
.
Bob has no control over Alice’s n − k remaining bits so Bob can cheat with maximum
probability
1
2n−k
·
(
1√
2
+
δ
2
)k
≤ 1
2n−k
·
√
2
k
(1 + γ)
2k
=
√
2
k
(1 + γ)
2n
. 
For the special case of
(2
1
)
-fOTwe have the following corollary.
Corollary 19: [Optimal
(2
1
)
-fOT] There exists a
(2
1
)
-fOT protocol where each party has
honest outcome probabilities of 1/4 and neither party can cheat with probability greater
20
than 1√
8
(1 + γ), for any γ > 0.
Note that we have strong coin flipping protocols with poly(m) rounds that achieve
δ = 1
poly(m) . Hence, our protocol also achieves γ =
1
poly(m) with poly(m) rounds.
Last, we remark that this protocol is completely classical with the exception of the
quantum coin flipping subroutines. This is similar to the optimal coin flipping protocol
in [CK09] designed using classical messages and optimal quantum weak coin flipping
subroutines.
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